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Immigration and the U.S. Labor Market:
Public Policy Gone Awry
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
One of the least discussed, yet most significant influences upon contemporary
economic affairs in the United States, has been the post-1965 revival of mass
immigration. In 1991, the annual number of foreign-born persons granted permanent
residence status set an all-time record high of 1.8 million persons. It was the second
consecutive year that such a record was established and the third straight year that the
number exceeded a million persons. But even these figures underestimate the actual
scale of entry because they do not include any allowance for illegal immigrants during
the year; or for refugees and asylees admitted that year who must wait at least a year
after entry before they can qualify for such status; or for foreign nationals who are
legally permitted to work in the United States (called "non-immigrant workers") for
specified periods of time. In terms of the stock of foreign born persons in the U.S.
population, the "official"estimates from the decennial Census counts confirm the post-
1965 trend. In 1970, the foreign born population totaled 9.6 million persons (or 4.7
percent of the population); by 1980, it was 13.9 million persons (or 6.2 percent of the
population) and by 1990 it was 19.8 million (or 7.9 percent of the population).! These
"official"figures also underestimate the true levels and actual percentages of the foreign
born population because they too seriously undercount the illegal immigrant population
of the nation. It was precisely in these contexts that a report by an international team of
social science scholars, who were commissioned to study U.S. society in the 1980s,
concluded that "at a time when attention is directed to the general decline in American
2exceptionalism, American immigration continues to flow at a rate unknown elsewhere in
the world." 2
The United States did not embark on its post-1965 course of mass immigration
with any forethought. It was not the product of careful planning or public debate.
Rather it has been the inadvertent consequence of the design and implementation of the
separate components of the nation's immigration policy, without any attention being
given to their collective effects, compounded by an appalling indifference by
policymakers to the unexpected outcomes of their legislative actions. Specifically, the
relevant policy components are those that pertain to the entry of legal immigrants, illegal
immigrants, refugees, asylees and foreign workers who are temporarily permitted to work
in the United States (i.e., "non-immigrant workers" in the parlance of immigration law).
Collectively, they constitute the mass immigration phenomenon of the current era. As it
is prevailing public policy that determines both the size and the composition of each of
the aforementioned immigrant groups, it is these policies --and not the foreign-born
persons themselves --that raise the question of congruence of mass immigration with the
prevailing national interest. The foreign born entrants are only responding as individuals
to the opportunities afforded by prevailing U.S. policy.
But, regardless of the reasons for specifically admitting or indifferently permitting
the mass entry of foreign born persons for permanent or temporary residence in the
United States, all immigrants must support themselves by their own work or by that of
others. Hence, there are economic consequences associated with their presence, whether
intended or not. Most adult immigrants, induding their spouses, enter the labor market
3soon after entry and most of their children will eventually do so. As the scale of
immigration has become larger, it follows that its economic effects on the size and the
composition of the labor market has also increased. Immigration policy, therefore, must
be recognized for what it is -- an instrument of economic policy. Unfortunately, as will
be discussed, policymakers have yet to adopt this fundamental perspective as they have
designed the features of the nation's immigration system or have appraised its
consequences.
With immigration currently accounting for 30-35 percent (depending on what
estimate of illegal immigration is applied) of the annual growth of the U.S. labor force, it
is essential to know how immigrants --regardless of their mode of entry -- fit into the
labor market. After all, our immigration policy is a purely discretionary act of the
federal government. The flow of immigrants is the one aspect of labor force size and
composition that public policy should be able to control and shape to serve the national
interest.
The Historical Role of Mass Immigration
It is true, of course, that immigration at times has played a significant role in the
economic history of the United States. The nation's political structure that has
postulated such ideals as freedom, equality under the law, and a toleration of diversity
has long appealed to persons from all parts of the globe. There has never been any
problem in attracting would-be immigrants when the nation thought it needed them. But
historical and economic circumstances change. What is both necessary and positive in its
effects at one time, may not be so at another time. Too much of modern economic
4analysis is ahistorical in its quest to interpret labor market happenings. But, with respect
to immigration, an appreciation of historical circumstance is the key to understanding the
policies that have governed the scale and shaped the composition of the immigrant flows
that have occurred at any given time. Thus, while the basic questions pertaining to the
nation's immigration policy remain the same --how many immigrants should be
admitted? what criteria should be used to choose who is admitted? how should the
policy be enforced? and what are the anticipated effects on the economy and the
domestic labor force of immigration? -- the answers will often be different.
In general, immigration policy prior to World War I was consistent with economic
development trends and labor force requirements of the United States. Throughout its
first century as an independent nation (Le., until the late 1870s and early 1880s), the
country had neither ceilings on the number nor screening restrictions as to the type of
people permitted to enter for permanent settlement. In this largely preindustrial stage,
the economy was dominated by agricultural production and the labor market by
agricultural employment. Most jobs required little training or educational preparation.
Policymakers did not need to concern themselves with human resource preparation
issues. Because the nation had a vast amount of land that was largely unpopulated and
it was still expanding its territory throughout much of this era, an unregulated
immigration policy was consistent with both the nation's basic labor market needs and its
requirements for nation building?
When the industrialization process began in earnest during the latter decades of
the nineteenth century, the newly introduced technology of mechanization also required
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mainly unskilled workers to fill the growing number of manufacturing jobs in the nation's
expanding urban labor markets. The same can be said of the employment growth in the
other goods sectors of mining, construction, and transportation at that time. Immigrants
became the major source of the workers for the growing non-agricultural urban labor
force in the North, Midwest, and West. Pools of citizen workers existed who could have
been incorporated to meet those needs. Most notably there were the millions of recently
freed blacks of the former slave economies of the rural South. There were also millions
of underutilized citizens from other racial groups living and working in the nation's vast
rural sector. But mass immigration from Asia and Europe became the chosen
alternative. Before long, however, immigration from China (in 1882) and Japan (in
1908) was banned in response to negative social reactions, so various ethnic immigrant
groups from Eastern and Southern Europe became the primary source of new workers
during this critical era of industrialization.
From purely an efficiency standpoint, the mass immigration of the late nineteenth
century and the first fourteen years of the twentieth century was consistent with the labor
market needs of the nation. Most of the immigrants were men, their numbers
consistently exceeding the number of women by 2 to 1 margin and at times by a 3 to 1
margin (for some specific ethnic groups the male to female ratio, was as high as 9 to 1).
Jobs created during this expansive era typically required little in the way of skill,
education, literacy, or fluency in English from the workforce. The enormous supply of
immigrants who came during this time generally lacked these human capital attributes
but, nonetheless, they reasonably matched the prevailing demand for labor. The
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technology asked little in the way of human capital and the immigrants of that era came
with little. The available jobs required mainly blood, sweat, and tears, and most
immigrants as well as most native-born workers of those periods amply provided all
three.
Beginning with the outbreak of World War I in 1914, however, the nation
experienced a sharp contraction in immigration. After the war, when it appeared that
mass unemployment might resume, the United States imposed its first quantitative
restrictions on the number of immigrants who could be admitted. A ceiling of about
154,000 immigrants a year from the countries of the Eastern Hemisphere was
established. Moreover, the pervasive negative social reactions to many of the recent
immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe also led to the adoption of overtly
discriminatory qualitative screening. Both of these restrictive actions were embodied in
the Immigration Act of 1924 (often called the National Origins Act). Ethnic screening
standards were enacted that favored immigrants from the nations of Western and
Northern Europe, disfavored all other Europeans, banned virtually all Asians, and
ignored most Africans. Immigration from the entire Western Hemisphere, however, was
not included in the ceiling or the national origin quotas of this legislation.
In the 1920s, the rapidly expanding domestic economy was characterized by the
widespread introduction of the assembly line method of production. The adoption of
capital-intensive mass production techniques no longer required unlimited numbers of
workers. Assembly line technology, however, still required largely unskilled workers.
With mass immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere curtailed, employers had to turn to
7domestic labor surpluses to meet their needs. They found these pools of underutilized
workers in the nation's massive rural economy. During the 1920s, the rural population
declined in absolute numbers for the first time in the nation's history. Among the new
supply of workers to respond to these urban job opportunities were the native-born
blacks of the rural South who could finally begin their exodus to the large cities of the
North, the South, and the West Coast. Also during this decade, there was a temporary
spurt in Western Hemisphere immigration -- especially from Canada and Mexico but
also from the Caribbean region.
The world wide depression of the decade of the 1930s, with its massive surplus of
unemployed job seekers, caused immigration from all nations to plummet. Full
employment returned with the war years of the 1940s but immigration did not. Would-
be immigrants could not leave the countries of Western and Northern Europe and
would-be immigrants from the Western Hemisphere, fearing the military draft, were
deterred from coming. The labor market was very tight. In this economic environment,
the federal government initiated unprecedented policies to reduce the artificial barriers
to the employment of women, the disabled, youth, and minority groups. Together, these
pressures provided access to a wide array of jobs that had been hitherto unavailable to
these domestic sources of labor supply. Thus, during the 1930s and 1940s even the low
entry quotas of prevailing immigration law were not met~
The pent-up demand for products and the forced-savings of the World War II era
led to economic prosperity in the postwar era of the late 1940s and the 1950s. It was
during these years of general affluence that the organized civil rights movement launched
8its assault on all aspects of overt discrimination within the U.S. society. This movement
achieved its legislative goals with the passage of historic legislation in 1964 (regarding
public accommodations and employment), in 1965 (regarding voting rights), and in 1968
(regarding fair housing). Although the impetus for these laws was primarily directed
toward addressing the treatment of black Americans, the legislation broadened rights
protection beyond race to include national origin, gender, religious belief, and color. In
subsequent years, equal employment opportunity policies have been expanded to provide
protection against discrimination on the basis of age, disability, and alienage. But what
is often overlooked in reviewing the evolution of the civil rights legislation is that the
pathbreaking laws of the 1960swere enacted at a time when immigration levels were still
sharply restricted. With regard to the employment implications of these laws, the
assumption was that they would not only terminate future discriminatory practices but
that they would also be accompanied by other human resource development policies
designed to redress the past denial of opportunities for victim groups to be prepared for
jobs. In the short run, this is, in fact, what did occur. Parallel legislation was adopted in
the mid-1960s pertaining to education, training, health, housing, community development
and poverty prevention. With unemployment declining in the mid-1960s, it was assumed
that the newly protected groups -- blacks in particular -- would soon become qualified to
fill the available jobs that a tightening labor market was providing. They would make it
possible for "the Great Society" to become a reality.
9As for the external manifestation of discrimination (i.e., the national origins
system) that was embodied in the nation's immigration law entering the 1960s, it was
only natural that it too --in this period of heightened domestic concern over civil
rights -- would be a target for reform. And it was. But the immigration reform
movement at the time did not include any plans for significantly raising the overall level
of immigration. It was focused entirely on purging the immigration statutes of the
explicit racism inherent in the national origins admission system. Every presidential
administration since that of Harry Truman in the late 1940s through to that of John
Kennedy in the early 1960s had sought to accomplish that feat. It was Lyndon Johnson
who successfully secured passage of the Immigration Act of 1965. What happened
afterwards, with respect to immigration, was entirely unanticipated. Namely, this
legislation set in motion forces that, over the ensuing years, accidentally triggered the
renewal of the mass immigration experience..5
The Non-Economic Design of the New Immigration Policy
Enactment of the Immigration Act of 1965 ended the era of using immigration for
racial and ethnic discrimination purposes. It also ushered in the era of mass immigration
that has continued to this day. Virtually dormant for more than forty years, this sleeping
giant from America's past was aroused. Instead of seizing the opportunity to craft a new
immigration policy to meet some positive definition of the public interest, however,
Congress created a policy aimed primarily at fulfilling the private interests of some of its
legal residents.
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The new law sharply increased immigration levels. A new ceiling on annual
immigration was set at 290,000 visas a year (plus their immediate family members) and
immigration from the Western Hemisphere was now included in this ceiling for the first
time. But of even greater consequence, it replaced the social goals of the national
origins admission system with a politically popular new admission system based on the
concept of family reunification. Seventy-four percent of total visas available each year
were reserved for various categories of adult relatives and extended family members of
U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens. In 1980, the percentage was raised to 80
percent. In addition, immediate family members (spouses, minor children and parents) of
each adult visa holder were made exempt from all quotas and were usually admitted
automatically. In other words, non-economic considerations were established as the
guiding principle for designing the nation's revised immigration policy. Table 1 shows
the meteoric growth in legal immigration that occurred from 1965 to 1991. Mass
immigration once again became a fact of life in the United States.
The Inadvertent Revival of Mass Immigration
There was no general shortage of would-be workers in the United States in the
1960s when the new immigration legislation was drafted, debated, and passed. The
nation was at war in Vietnam, which had contributed to a sharply declining
unemployment rate, but it was not expected at the time that the war would be long or
that low unemployment would prevail once the increased military expenditures
associated with the military build-up had passed.6 Moreover, the post-World War II
"baby-boom" had just reached the stage in 1965when it was beginning to pour an
lOa
TABLE 1: ANNUAL LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES BY MAJOR
IMMIGRANT CATEGORIES DURING FISCAL YEARS 1965-91"
Occupational
Year Total Immediate relativesb Relative preference" preferenced All other
1991 1,827,167 237,103 216,088 54,949 1,319,027
1990 1,536,483 231,680 214,550 53,729 1,268,204
1989 1,090.924 217,514 217,092 52,775 603,543
1988 643,025 219,340 200,772 53,607 169,306
1987 601,516 218,575 211 ,809 53,873 117,259
1986 601,708 223,468 212,939 53,625 111,676
1985 570,009 204,368 213,257 50,895 101,489
1984 543,903 183,247 212,324 49,521 98,811
1983 559,763 177,792 213,488 55,468 113,015
1982 594,131 168,398 206,065 51,182 168,486
1981 596,600 152,359 226,576 44,311 173,354
1980 530,639 151,131 216,856 44,369 118,283
1979 460,348 138,178 213,729 37,709 70,732
1978 601,442 125,819 123,501 26,295 325,827
1977 462,315 105,957 117,649 21,616 217,093
1976 398,613 102,019 102,007 26,361 168,226
1976-TQ 103,676 27,895 28,382 5,621 41,778
1975 386,194 91,504 95,945 29,334 169,411
1974 394,861 104,844 94,915 28,482 166,620
1973 400,063 100,953 92,054 26,767 180,289
1972 384,685 86,332 83,165 33,714 181,474
1971 370,478 80,845 82,191 34,563 172,879
1970 373,326 79,213 92,432 34,016 167,665
1969 358,579 60,016 92,458 31,763 174,342
1968 454,448 43,677 68,384 26,865 315,522
1967 361,972 46,903 79,671 25,365 210,033
1966 323,040 39,231 54,935 10,525 218,349
1965 296,697 32,714 13,082 4,986 245,915
"The categories listed are generally used to describe large groups of immigrants. During 1965-91, minor changes were made
in the qualifications for some immigrant classes making up these categories.
bSpouses of citizens, children (unmarried and younger than 21) of citizens, and parents of citizens 21 or older.
"The 1st, 2nd, 4th, and 5th categories of the immigrant preference system. The 1st preference allows the entry of unmarried
sons and daughters (older than 21) of U.S. citizens. The 2nd preference covers spouses and unmarried sons and daughters of
aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The 4th preference allows for the entry of married sons and daughters of U.s.
citizens. The 5th preference deals with the brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens, provided such citizens are at least 21 years old.
ctrhe 3rd and 6th categories of the immigrant preference system. The 3rd preference allows for the admission of members of
the professions and scientists or artists of exceptional ability. The 6th preference covers skilled or unskilled occupations for
which labor is in short supply in the United States.
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
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unprecedented number of new job seekers into the labor market -- a process that would
continue unabated for the next 15 years before gradually tapering off in the 1980s.
How is it, then, that mass immigration could have been revived by a reform
movement that did not seek such an objective? The explanation rests with what David
North and Marion Houstoun have aptly described as "negative intent." As they explain,
"those interested in reforming the immigration law were so incensed with the
ethnocentrism of the laws of the past that they spent virtually all of their energies
seeking to eliminate the country-of-origin provisions, and gave very little attention to the
substance or long range implications of the policy that would replace them." 7 As a
consequence, the Immigration Act of 1965 abolished the national origins system and
replaced it with the aforementioned admission system that was primarily designed to
reunify adult family members living abroad with adult relatives who already lived in the
United States. This admission system had strong political support in Congress because it
satisfied the private and personal interests of those citizens who themselves had been
recent immigrants. For under the national origins system, it was these constituencies
who were more likely to have close relatives who were still citizens of other nations.
Family reunification was also viewed by other political interest groups as a way to
perpetuate the old national origins systems but under a guise that was more politically
acceptable. It was believed by these groups that those racial and ethnic groups that had
been discriminated against for the past 40 years would be less likely to have living
relatives in their homelands who might wish to immigrate in the near future. As the
Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives and the co-
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sponsor of the Immigration Act of 1965, Emanuel Celler (D-N.Y), stated during the final
day of floor debate on the legislation explained, "there will not be, comparatively, many
Asians or Africans entering the country since the people of Africa and Asia have very
few relatives here, comparatively, few could immigrate from those countries because they
have no family ties to the United States." 8 Thus, the satisfaction of political concerns
replaced the pursuit of social ends as the key rationale of the nation's new immigration
admission system.
The congressional designers of the legislation in 1965, however, overlooked the
fact that many of the immigrants since 1924 had come from Western Hemisphere
nations. They had significant numbers of living relatives who could avail themselves of
the families preferences of the new law and they began to do so. Immigration from
Mexico in particular and Latin America in general quickly soared. It was also unforseen
by legislators that significant numbers of Asians would initially make use of the
occupational preferences to establish a base for immigrants who could subsequently use
the family preference provisions to secure entry for extended family members. Nor was
it anticipated that there would be an enormous inflow of refugees from Southeast Asia in
the wake of the Vietnam War debacle who would be admitted and, subsequently, use the
family admission system to leverage the admission of their extended families. So Asian
immigration accelerated. It was also the case that the economies of the nations of
Western Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s were thriving so there was little impulse
for persons from these nations to want to leave while immigration from Eastern Europe
was foreclosed by the presence of the Iron Curtain that prevented any emigration from
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that region. Hence, by the late 1980s, over 85 percent of all immigrants to the United
States each year were coming from the countries of Latin America and Asia.
A consequence of the unexpected change in the nations of origin that ensued after
1965 was the steady rise in the number of immediate relatives who accompanied each
visa holder (see Table 1). The shift in countries of origin of immigrants away from
Europe to Latin America and Asia led to an increase in the size of families with minor
children accompanying visa holders. Moreover, in these new source countries, the notion
of extended families is a more prevalent cultural characteristic. Thus, the number of
parents of U.S. citizens among the immigrant flow has also increased dramatically since
1965.
Table 1 shows that the number of immigrants who entered from "other sources"
also contributed to the post-1965 surge in immigration in a major way. One cause of the
growth in this category has come from the growth in refugee and asylee admissions. Tbe
Immigration Act of 1965 provided for the first time since immigration had become a
subject of regulation, a formal route for certain refugees (17,400 persons a year) to be
admitted on the basis of humanitarian concerns. Unfortunately, the qualifications for
being a refugee in this legislation were restricted to those persons faced with persecution
from nations to which U.S. foreign policy was opposed (that is, those from Communist-
dominated nations) or who were fleeing from persecution countries in the Middle East
rather than individuals confronted with persecution per se. Hence, even this aspect of
the law was designed primarily to serve political priorities. International events
(especially in Cuba and Vietnam), however, soon led to a rapid escalation in the number
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of refugees admitted to the United States that far exceeded the annual number
permitted to enter by the Immigration Act of 1965. An administrative procedure (called
the "parole authority" of the U.S. Attorney General) and specially enacted adjustment
legislation by Congress were then used to admit most of the refugees during this era.9
As will be discussed later, the acceleration in the number of refugees admitted to the
United States from 1965 to 1980 led to the removal of refugees from the legal
immigration system in 1980 and the establishment of a separate entry mechanism for
their admission.
The Immigration Act of 1965 was also important for what it did not do.
Specifically, it failed to enact any effective measures to enhance the enforcement of its
new provisions. Its supporters did not foresee the imminent explosion of illegal
immigration (see Table 2) that quickly ensued in the years after its passage.lO The lack
of effective deterrence in the Act invited mass abuse --an outcome that policymakers for
many years chose to ignore.
Within a decade of the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965, it was clear that
immigration policy had gone seriously awry. Immigration reform was again placed on
the national agenda. In 1978, Congress established the Select Commission on
Immigration and Refuge Policy (SCIRP) to study the effects of what had transpired and
to make recommendations for changes. Appointed by President Jimmy Carter, this
sixteen member commission was chaired by the Rev. Theodore Hesburgh (who was
President of Notre Dame University at the time). When it issued its comprehensive
report in March 1981, the Select Committee concluded that immigration was "out of
14a
TABLE 2: ALIENS APPREHENDED, FISCAL YEARS 1961-1991
1961-70 1,608,356
1961 88,823
1962 92,758
1963 88,712
1964 86,597
1965 110,371
1966 138,520
1967 161,608
1968 212,057
1969 283,557
1970 345,353
1971-80 8,321,498
1971 420,126
1972 505,949
1973 655,968
1974 788,145
1975 766,600
1976 875,915
1976 TQ 221.824
1977 1,042,215
1978 1,057,977
1979 1,076,418
1980 910,361
1981-90 11,883,328
1981 975,780
1982 970,246
1983 1,251,357
1984 1,246,981
1985 1,348,749
1986 1,767,400
1987 1,190,488
1988 1,008,145
1989 954,243
1990 1,169,939
1991-
1991 1,197,875 (preliminary)
TQ = Transitional quarter that occurs when the Federal Government shifted its fiscal year
from ending on June 30 to ending on September 30.
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
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control"; that the nation must accept "the reality of limitations"; and that "a cautious
approach" should be taken in the design of any reform measures.l1
In the wake of the SCRIP report, Congress enacted three major immigration
statutes. They were the Refugee Act of 1980 (which relied extensively on the work of
SCIRP that was in progress); the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, and the
capstone, the Immigration Act of 1990. In part, each of these laws embraces some of the
specific recommendations put forth by SCRIP. But each statute has gone well beyond
SCRIP's recommendations. The overall effect of these laws has been to ignore the
"cautious approach" and the modest proposals suggested by the Select Commission. The
result has been to dramatically raise the already high levels of immigration to even
higher plateaus. Indeed, a 1991 study by the Urban Institute concluded that these
statutory changes "have reaffirmed the United States' role as the principal immigrant-
receiving nation in the world." 12 The same report found it "remarkable" that
policymakers enacted the Immigration Act of 1990 "with the nation poised on the brink
of a recession and a war in the Persian Gulf' and at a time "when other industrialized
countries are making theirs [Le., their immigration policies] more restrictive." 13
The reason that Congress could take such "remarkable" expansionary actions is
that immigration policy has been allowed to develop without any regard as to its
economic consequences. Indeed, a better descriptive adjective would be "irresponsible."
For in this area of public policymaking, special interest groups with private agendas have
captured the lawmaking process. They simply ignore any concern for the national
interest. The Select Commission specifically warned of their growing influence and it
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rejected their myopic appeals. As its report unequivocally stated, "the commission has
rejected the arguments of many economists, ethnic groups, and religious leaders for a
great expansion in the number of immigrants and refugees." 14 It went on to say that
"this is not the time for a large-scale expansion in legal immigration --for resident aliens
or temporary workers." 15 But the warnings proved to be of no avail. Congress chose to
appease the political interest groups. The consequence is that immigration policy
remains essentially a political instrument largely unconstrained by the economic
environment to which it is applied.
The Policy Manifestations of Mass Immigration
Each of the legislative actions of the past decade require brief description. To its
credit, the Refugee Act of 1980 did eliminate the ideological biases associated with the
definition of refugees in the earlier 1965 law. The new definition of refugees embraced
the United Nation's definition to include individuals confronted with the prospect of
persecution regardless of whether it is threatened by totalitarian regimes of the political
left or right. The 1980 refugee law separated refugee admissions from the legal
immigration system and, in the process, created a new immigrant entry route with no
fixed annual ceiling. The number of refugees admitted each year varies depending on
the amount of domestic political pressure exerted by special interest groups on the
President. He is empowered to set the number of refugees to be admitted each year
after a largely pro forma consultation with Congress. Subsequent annual admission
figures have ranged from a low of 67,000 refugees in 1986 to a high of 217,000 refugees
in 1981. The admission figure for 1991 was 131,000. Obviously, no labor market test is
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applied to refugee admissions. Nonetheless, there are labor market consequences. The
preponderance of refugees since 1980 have been from Third World nations in Asia, the
Caribbean area, and Central America. Most have been deficient in their levels of skill,
education, and English language proficiency. Many have clustered together in a handful
of urban enclaves.
As for illegal immigration, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA) was intended to curtail such entries. Among its multiple provisions, two public
policy instruments emerged that are of paramount importance to the issue of
immigration. To prevent future entries of illegal immigrants, civil and criminal sanctions
were enacted that made the employment of illegal immigrants by employers an illegal
act. As for those illegal immigrants already in the country at the time, four generous
amnesty programs were enacted which over 3.2 million persons subsequently availed
themselves.
With regard to employer sanctions, the legislation was fraught with enforcement
loopholes so that by 1990 it was estimated that there were still 4 million illegal
immigrants in the country and these numbers continue to mount by the day.
Apprehensions, which declined slightly after the passage of IRCA, have subsequently
soared again (see Table 2). There is no data on the thousands of illegal immigrants who
enter each year but who are not apprehended. Illegal immigrants, of course, enter
without regard to their preparation for available jobs or to the effect they might have on
citizen workers with comparable skills or education.
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As for the amnesty provisions, no labor qualifications were imposed on the
amnesty recipients whose entry into the labor force has now been legitimized. As with
refugees, most illegal immigrants and amnesty recipients have been from less
economically developed nations of the world, and most have similar deficiencies in their
skill training, education, and ability to speak English. They, too, have tended to cluster
in enclaves --mainly the central cities of urban areas but also in some rural communities
where labor-intensive agricultural methods prevail.
As for the Immigration Act of 1990 (which became effective on October 1, 1991),
it was passed with little public debate and while the nation's attention was diverted by a
major budget battle between President George Bush and Congress (i.e., the infamous
"read my lips" controversy). It was passed on the last day of the 10ist session of
Congress and signed into law by President Bush on November 29, 1990. The most
significant feature of the new law is that its primary focus is on increasing the quantity of
immigrants. Under its terms, the level of annual legal immigration was raised to 700,000
people a year -- a 35 percent increase over the prevailing levels of the law it replaced.
As was previously the case with the Immigration Act of 1965, the new law gives short
shrift to the specific human capital endowments of most of those to be admitted or to
the prevailing labor market conditions of the U.S. economy that may prevail at the time
of their entry. Thus, the new legislation perpetuates the notion that immigration
policy -- despite its magnitude -- has little accountability for its economic consequences.
While the Immigration Act of 1990 does increase the number of immigrants
admitted on the basis of occupational needs from the previous level of 54,000 visas a
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year to 140,000visas a year, the actual percentage of work-related visas to the total
number of visas remains the same, 20 percent, (i.e., 140,000 of 700,000 is 20 percent) as
under the law it replaced. Hence, there is no real change in policy focus.
Furthermore, the use of the 140,000figure to indicate the number of work-related
immigrants to be admitted each year is a gross overstatement of what the law actually
provides. This is because the number of work-related slots include not only the eligible
workers themselves but also all of their "accompanying family members." As a result, the
number of actual needed workers specifically admitted under the work-related provisions
will be far fewer --perhaps only one-third or less of the total annual figure of 140,000
admissions. It is likely, therefore, that the majority of those admitted under the work-
related provisions will actually be admitted only because they too are family members.
Moreover, any work-related slots that are not used in any given year are to be added to
those slots available solely for family-related admissions. Hence, with massive backlogs
of would-be family relatives currently existing, it is certain that the 700,000 immigrants
will be coming every year until such time as the legislation is changed.
In addition, the law introduces questionable new entry routes, such as for "investor
immigrants" who can now "buy their way in." It also provides a new entry route through
a category known as "diversity immigrants." This concept resurrects one of the most
reprehensible features of past U.S. immigration history. It is the use of national origin
criteria for admission of immigrants from designated nations from which immigration
had, since 1965, been low due to the huge backlogs of persons from Asia and Latin
America. There is no labor market test associated with the admission of "diversity
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immigrants" for whom 40,000 visas a year are available through 1994 (afterwards the
number increases to 55,000 visas a year).
Finally, the immigration system permits certain foreign workers to be employed in
the United States under specified labor market circumstances. Known as non-immigrant
workers, their numbers have been growing steadily and are now in excess of 400,000 a
year. There are no annual ceilings on the total number of non-immigrant workers who
can be admitted. They are legally employed in a variety of occupations, ranging from
farmworkers to nurses to engineers to professors to scientists. Most non-immigrant
workers can be admitted only if qualified citizen workers cannot be found. But typically,
only perfunctory checks are made to test for citizen availability. Supposedly, the non-
immigrant workers are admitted only for temporary periods, but their visas can be
extended in some cases for up to five years. The increasing dependence of U.S.
employers on non-immigrant workers is a clear signal that something is seriously wrong
with the current immigration system. It indicates that the legal immigration system lacks
the direction and the flexibility to respond to legitimate shortages of qualified workers to
fill real job vacancies.
If immigration were insignificant in its size and if the human capital characteristics
of those entering were generally consistent with contemporary labor market needs, there
would be little reason to worry about the employment consequences of such a politically
driven policy. But neither conditions are present. The scale of immigration --in all of
its diverse forms --is without historical precedent. Most of the immigrants -- regardless
of mode of entry have been from less economically developed nations. Many lack skills
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training, basic education, and the ability to speak English. The vast majority have tended
to cluster in enclaves -- primarily in urban areas. Moreover, the accidental revival of
mass immigration re-emerged just as the nation's labor market entered a period of
radical transformation.
The Issue of Labor Force Transformation
The revival of mass immigration has occurred at a time when the labor force of
the United States was entering a phase of sustained growth and significant change. From
1965 to 1990, the U.S. civilian labor force grew from 74.4 million workers to 124.7
million workers -- or on average by over 2 million workers a year. In part, of course,
mass immigration has contributed to the growth but immigration, as noted earlier, is
estimated to account for only about one-third of the growth. Other contributing factors
have been the maturing of the post-World War II "baby boom" generation to working
age and the unprecedented entry of women into the labor market that occurred over this
same interval. The point is that there has been no general shortage of labor in the post-
1965 era to the present time that might warrant such a dramatic increase in immigration.
It is true that the U.S. Department of Labor has projected that labor force growth will
decline somewhat to about 1.6 million workers a year through to the year 2000. But his
still means that the labor force for the 1990s will grow by 19.5 million workers over the
decade.16 But this "official" growth projection for the 1990s grossly understated
immigration flows at the time it was made and has become obsolete by subsequent
legislative developments. The Department of Labor projection estimated that 100,000
illegal immigrants a year would enter the country when the figure is now known to
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exceed this by several multiples; it made no allowance for the more than 3 million
former illegal immigrants who received approval of their amnesty petitions since 1988 or
for the subsequent family reunification implications associated with their admission; it
used an estimate of annual legal immigration of 400,000 a year when the figure was over
500,000 immigrants a year and rises to 700,000 persons a year under the newly enacted
Immigration Act of 1990; and it totally omitted any allowance for annual admission of
refugees. In all likelihood, labor force growth for the 1990s will approach the record
levels of the 1980s and should certainly exceed the official projections. When this
sustained growth in the size of labor force is combined with the explicit underutilization
of the labor force inherent in the persistent unemployment rates in the mid-7 percent
range, of the early 1990s, it is inconceivable that the United States will have a shortage
of potential workers in the remainder of this decade.
But in addition to the issue of labor force growth, it is also the case that the labor
market is in a period of radical transformation.17 On the labor demand side, there are
new restructuring forces at work associated with the nature and pace of technological
change; there is the advent of international competition which the U.S. economy is
confronting for the first time in its history; there are major shifts in consumer spending
preferences away from goods toward services; and there are the employment adjustment
effects of substantial reductions in national defense expenditures that began in the 1990s
with the end of the Cold War. Collectively, these forces are reshaping the nation's
occupational, industrial, and geographic employment patterns.
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As shown in Table 3, employment in most goods-producing industries is declining,
while it is increasing in most service industries. In more dramatic terms, Table 4 shows
the shift in industrial employment in percentage terms from the goods producing sector
to the service sector. With regard to occupational shifts, Table 5 shows the increasing
percentage of employment in the non-production occupations (i.e., white collar jobs) and
the declining percentages of employed in the production occupations (i.e., blue collar
jobs) that is occurring in every industrial sector. It is in Table 6, however, that the
occupational restructuring of the U.S. economy is most vividly portrayed. From 1978 to
1990, a timespan when the number of employed persons increased by an incredible 22.1
percent, the distribution of occupational growth was sharply skewed. The share of
overall employment growth was the greatest for the occupations that required the highest
levels of training and the most extensive amounts of eduction. Conversely, the share of
employment growth was the smallest for those that entail the least job preparation.
Indeed, most of the unskilled occupations -- private household workers, laborers, and
farmworkers --there was negative growth over this twelve year period. In other words
low skilled jobs are rapidly disappearing from the U.S. economy.
The U.S. economy is also in the midst of significant geographic shifts in its
employment patterns. The expansion of non-agricultural employment in the United
States is extremely unbalanced.18 The regions of greatest employment growth in the
1970s and 1980s were in the South Atlantic (from Delaware to Florida), West South
Central (from Arkansas to Texas), and the Pacific Coast regions. The areas of greatest
decline have been in the mid-Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) and
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Table 3: Employees on Non Farm Payrolls, by Major Industry,
Ten-year intervals, 1950-1990
(in thousands)
Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Industry
Goods Producine
Mining 901 712 623 1,027 735
Construction 2,333 2,885 3,536 4,346 5,205
Manufacturing 15,241 16,796 19,349 20,285 19,064
Service Producing
Transportation
Communications,
and Public Utilities 4,034 4,004 4,504 5,146 5,838
Wholesale Trade 2,518 3,004 3,816 5,275 6,361
Retail Trade 6,868 8,388 11,255 15,035 19,790
Finance, Insurance,
and Real Estate 1,919 2,669 3,687 5,160 6,833
Personal Services 5,382 7,423 11,641 17,890 28,209
Government 6.026 8.353 12.561 16.241 18.295
Total 45,222 54,234 70,920 90,405 110,330
Source: Economic Report of the President: 1991
Sector/Year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Percent in Goods 41.6 37.6 33.1 28.4 22.7
Percent in Services 58.4 62.4 66.9 71.6 77.3
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table 4: Percentage of Employees on Non Farm Payrolls, by Goods
Producing and Service Producing Sectors, for Ten Year Intervals,
1950 -1990
(percentage terms)
Source: Economic Report of the President: 1991
Table 5: Percentage of Employees in Private Sector Who Are
Employed in Non-Production or Supervisory Occupations
(percentage terms)
Industry/Y ear 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Goods Producing
Mining 9.4 19.9 24.1 25.8 28.0
Construction 11.1 14.7 16.7 21.3 23.0
Manufacturing 17.8 25.1 27.5 29.9 32.1
Servicing Production
Transportation, Communi-
cation, and Public
Utilities N.A. N.A. 13.3 16.6 16.9
Wholesale Trade 9.6 13.9 16.6 18.2 19.8
Retail Trade 5.6 7.5 9.1 10.2 11.5
Finance, Insurance, and
Real Estate 17.1 18.4 21.0 24.3 27.4
Personal Services N.A. N.A. 9.2 11.0 12.8
N.A. = Not Available
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Source: U.S. Department of Labor
Major Occupation Percentage Increase (or decrease) Share of Employment
from 1978 to 1990 Increase (or decrease)
Execurive, ~anager 56.7 25
and Administrator
Professional 42.3 22
Technical 45.8 5
Sales 36.7 18
Administrarive Support 18.4 13
Protecrive Services 35.9 2
Private Household -26.1 -1
Other Services 24.3 12
Prevision Producrion
and Craft 13.9 8
~achine Operator -10.0 -4
Transportarion Operatives 7.9 2
Laborers -3.9 -1
Farm, Forestry and
Fish Workers -7.9 -lTotal
Occuparional Growth
for U.S. Economy 22.1% 100%
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Table 6: Actual Percentage Growth and Percentage Share for Major
Occupational Groups in U.S. Economy Between 1978 and 1990
(percentage terms)
Source: John H. Bishop and Shani Carter, "How Accurate are Recent BLS Occupational
Projections?" ~onthly Labor Review, (October 1991) p. 38.
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East North Central (the Great Lakes area from Wisconsin through to Ohio) regions.
The employment shifts reflect the broader movement of the population away from the
Northeast and Midwest to the South and West.
The 1990 Census also revealed that, for the first time in the nation's history, more
than half of the nation's population lived in the 39 large metropolitan areas with a
population of one million persons or more.19 In 1950, 30 percent of the population lived
in such areas; in 1980, 46 percent did; and in 1990 slightly over 50 percent did. Of these
39 large metropolitan areas, 90 percent grew in size over the decade of the 1980s. The
greatest growth came in the metropolitan areas in the South Atlantic states (e.g., 9 or the
12 fastest growing metropolitan areas in the nation were in Florida) and the Pacific
Coast states. The greatest growth in metropolitan areas, however, was in the suburbs
and not the central cities of metropolitan areas. Of the five largest metropolitan areas
that lost populations, four (Pittsburgh, Buffalo, Cleveland, and Detroit) were in the
former manufacturing heartland region bordering on the Great Lakes. The only other
metropolitan area to decline was New Orleans. Implicit in the proportional growth of all
metropolitan areas, of course, is the proportional decline in non-metropolitan areas (i.e.,
rural areas).
On the labor supply side, the nation's labor force has not only been growing in
size at a pace far faster than all of its major industrial competitors combined and at a
rate without precedent in its own history, but, of even greater significance, its
composition is also undergoing significant changes. The fastest growing segments of the
labor force are women, minorities, and immigrants. Women in general and minorities in
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particular (with the possible exception of Asian Americans) have had fewer opportunities
to be trained, educated, or prepared for the occupations that are predicted to increase
the most in the coming decade. They are disproportionately concentrated in occupations
and industries already in decline or which are most vulnerable to decline in the near
future. As for immigrants, with human capital attributes playing such a minor role in the
determination of who enters, it is not surprising that George Borjas, in his 1990
assessment of the economic impact of immigration, found that "the more recent
immigrant waves have less schooling, lower earnings, lower labor force participation and
higher poverty rates than earlier waves had at similar stages of their assimilation into the
country." 20 Nor should it be surprising to learn that the use of welfare assistance by
immigrants has also been found to be higher than that of earlier waves of immigrants?1
What the nation faces is a shortage of qualified labor. In such a case, the
appropriate policy need is to address the mounting mismatch between the skills of the
citizen workforce and the emerging skill and education requirements of the workplace.
In other words, an expanded national human resource development policy for citizen
workers is what is required. In this context, there is certainly no need for an
immigration policy that annually admits or tolerates the mass entry of immigrants
without regard to their human capital attributes or which places additional remedial
burdens on an already underfunded and inadequate education and training system.
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The Conflict of Immigration Policy with the National Interest
When Congress embarked in the 1960s on the course of adopting a politically
driven immigration policy that essentially neglects economic considerations, few people
recognized that the country was entering such a phase of fundamental economic change
and labor market restructuring. Even after the new employment trends became evident
in the 1980s, the congressional committees responsible for designing immigration policy
ignored the signs as the provisions of the Immigration Act of 1990 vividly demonstrate.
By definition, immigration policy can influence the quantitative size of the labor
force as well as the qualitative characteristics of those it admits. Currently, there is little
synchronization of immigrant flows with demonstrated needs of the labor market. With
widespread uncertainty as to the number of immigrant workers who will enter in any
given year, it is impossible to know in advance of their actual entry how many foreign-
born people will annually join the U.S. labor force. Moreover, whatever skills,
education, linguistic abilities, talents, or locational settlement preferences most
immigrants and refugees possess are largely incidental to the reason they are legally
admitted or illegally enter.
The labor market effects of the politically driven immigration system are twofold.
On the one hand, some immigrant and non-immigrant workers have human resources
endowments that are quite congruent with the emerging labor market needs. Some have
the education, skills, and work experience that are desperately needed to fill vacant jobs
that are the result of the appalling lack of attention paid by policymakers to the
adequate preparation of citizens for the emerging new job requirements of the labor
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market. But even in those instances where legitimate labor shortages exist, immigration
should never be allowed to dampen two types of market pressures: those needed to
encourage citizen workers to invest in preparing for vocations that are expanding; and
those needed to ensure that government bodies provide the requisite human resource
development programs needed to prepare citizens for the new types of jobs that are
emerging. First recourse always should be to retrain and re-educate unqualified workers
and to relocate unemployed and underemployed qualified workers. As the Commission
on Workforce Quality and Labor Market Efficiency warned in its 1989 report to the U.S.
Secretary of Labor, "by using immigration to relieve shortages, we may miss the
opportunity to draw additional U.S. workers into the economic mainstream." 22 It went on
to state that public policy should "always try to train citizens to fill labor shortages." 23
This fundamental principle of priority is presently missing in the formulation of the
nation's immigration policies.
On the other hand, most immigrants of this post-1965 era have lacked the human
capital attributes that the labor market requires. As shown in Table 7, the occupations
of legal immigrants and refugees are essentially the mirror opposite of those occupations
that are shown in Table 6 to be growing the most. The majority of immigrants have
sought employment in declining sectors of goods-producing industries or low-wage
sectors of the expanding service sector. Such immigrants and their family members --
especially those who have entered illegally --are a major reason for the revival of "sweat
shop" enterprises and the upsurge in the child labor violations reported in the nation's
urban centers.24 The mounting presence of such Third World working conditions in
Professional Managers Clerical Sales Craftsman, Operatives Laborers Private Service Farmers Farm No
Fiscal Total tcclmical, officials, and and kind red workers foremen, and exc.fann household workers and farm laborers occupa-
year and kindred proprietors workers and kindred kindred and mine (exc. priv m8.JlB.gers and banI
workers (exc. farm) workers workers household) foreman
1970 373,326 12.3 1.6 3.7 .7 7.5 4.9 3.8 2.7 2.5 1.0 1.2 57.9
1975 386,194 9.9 2.6 3.8 .9 5.5 4.8 3.4 1.5 4.2 .2 1.6 61.3
1979' 530,639 8.6 4.0 4.6 1.0 4.4 6.6 3.0 1.9 3.5 .2 2.1 59.8
~v
"
~1985 570,009 7.3 3.6 3.4 2.1 4.6 8.5 7.5 1.9 6I.l
1989 1.068,342 4.2 3.0 4.2 2.0 6.4 15.7 12.8 2.9 48.5
1990 1,536,483 4.4 3.0 3.7 2.0 7.3 15.9 14.9 6.8 41.7
TABLE 7: PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS, BY MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP AT TIME OF
ARRIVAL, SELECTED YEARS 1970-1990
'Includes dc:pendent women and children and other aliens without occupation or occupation not reported.
'Occupational data for 1980 and 1981 were 108tin dala processing by INS (see 1981 Slatistical Yearbook of the INS (Washington D.C.: U.S. GovemmentPrinting Office, 1982), p. VII). Hence, 1979 dala are used.
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
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many cities is nothing for the nation to be proud of, regardless of whether these
immigrants actually displace citizen workers in exploitive work situations.
Unfortunately, many citizen workers who are among the urban working poor are
also employed in many of the same declining occupations and industries. A
disproportionately high number of these citizens are minorities --especially young people
and women. The last thing these citizen groups need is more competition from
immigrants for the declining number of low-skill jobs that provide a livable income or for
the limited opportunities for training and education that are available to low-income
workers. Other citizens have withdrawn from the labor force due to becoming
discouraged from hoping to find a job in the legitimate labor market and have become
part of the swelling urban underclass. Thus, the flooding of low-wage labor markets with
unskilled immigrant workers renders hollow the political rhetoric at the national level
that there is any serious public concern for their well-being.
Moreover, no technologically advanced industrial nation that has 27 million
illiterate and another 20-40 million marginally literate adults need fear a shortage of
unskilled workers in its foreseeable future?5 Indeed, immigration --especially that of
illegal immigrants, amnesty recipients, and refugees -- is a major contributor to the
growth of adult illiteracy in the United States. To this degree, immigration, by adding to
the surplus of illiterate adult job seekers, is serving to diminish the limited opportunities
for poorly prepared citizens to find jobs or to improve their employability by on-the-job
training. It is not surprising, therefore, that the underground economy is thriving in
many urban centers. Moreover, the scale and nature of the overall immigration and
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refugee flows are also contributing to the need for localities to expand funding for
remedial education, basic job skill training, and language acquisition programs in many
urban communities. Too often these funding choices cause scarce public funds to be
diverted from being used to upgrade the human resource capabilities of the citizen labor
force.
The incidence of urban unemployment, poverty, and adult illiteracy is much
higher and the educational attainment levels significantly lower for blacks and Hispanics
than for non-Hispanic whites and Asians. In addition, blacks and Hispanics are
disproportionately employed in industries and occupations already in sharpest decline --
the goods-producing industries and blue-collar occupations. Thus, the most rapidly
increasing groups in the labor force are precisely those most adversely at risk from the
changing employment requirements. Both groups have unemployment rates that are
considerably above the already high average rate for the nation that has prevailed during
the early 1990s. Unless public policy measures are targeted to address their human
resource development needs, many members of both groups, as well as other vulnerable
segments of the general population, will have dim employment and income prospects in
the emerging post-industrial economy.
If the policy of mass and unguided immigration continues, it is unlikely that there
will be sufficient pressure to enact the long-term human resource development policies
needed to prepare and to incorporate these citizen groups into the mainstream economy.
Instead, by providing both competition and alternatives, the large and unplanned influx
of immigrant labor will serve to maintain the social marginalization of many citizen
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blacks and citizen Hispanics in particular and all unskilled workers in genera1.26
Moreover, it will also mean that job opportunities will be reduced for the growing
numbers of older workers of all racial and ethnic heritages who may wish to prolong
their working lives and who were given employment protections by Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1968 in order to pursue such aspirations. The same can be said
for the vast pool of disabled citizens who were only recently extended employment
protection by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
In other words, a substantial human reserve of potential citizen workers already
exists. If their human resource development needs were addressed comprehensively,
they could provide an ample supply of workers for the labor force needs of the 1990s
and beyond. Without changes made in the nation's immigration policy, the immigration
system will guarantee that many citizens from these groups will remain unemployed,
underemployed, or only marginally attached to the labor force. As matters stand,
immigration policy represents a major obstacle to the achievement of a politically stable,
fully employed and truly equitable society.
The Elements of Immigration Reform
As the United States enters the 1990s, evolving employment patterns
overwhelmingly reveal a preference for skilled and educated workers as well as a
diminished parallel demand for job seekers who lack these human capital endowments.
The nation is facing the worst possible labor market situation: a shortage of qualified
workers coexisting with a surplus of unqualified job seekers, with clear racial dimensions
as to who is in which grouping. At this juncture in the economic development of the
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United States, immigration policy must be seen for what it is: a critical element of
national economic policy. For as Napoleon once said, "policy is destiny." Maintenance
of existing immigration policy cannot possibly be in the national interest. Major policy
changes are required.
The most important reform that is needed is to shift the emphasis of the legal
immigration admission system away from the politically popular family reunification to
one that is primarily designed to serve economic purposes. Legal entry should be
primarily restricted to skilled and educated immigrants because America has an
abundance of unskilled and poorly prepared would-be workers. With job prospects for
unskilled and semiskilled workers becoming dimmer by the day, long-term human
resource strategy must be predicated on ways to enhance the employability of workers
facing reduced demand for their services and to prevent future would-be workers from
confronting such dismal prospects. That too many of those lacking sufficient skills and
education are from the nation's growing minority populations only adds urgency to this
domestic challenge. The United States cannot allow the labor force to continue to
polarize along racial and class lines if it hopes to prosper and persevere. Because it
takes time for would-be workers to acquire skills and education, immigration policy as it
pertains to legal immigrants and non-immigrants can be used on a short-run basis to
target experienced workers who possess these abilities. But the preparedness, or lack
thereof, of significant portions of the domestic labor force is the fundamental economic
issue confronting the United States. Over the long haul, citizen workers must be
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prepared to qualify for jobs that are expanding and which have the greatest growth
potential.
Changing the admission priorities of the legal immigration system will have little
benefit if illegal immigration continues to flourish. Hence, it is also imperative that
IRCA's provisions to reduce illegal immigration be strengthened. To do this, it will be
necessary to adopt a counterfeit-proof identification system; to tighten restrictions on the
use of fraudulent documents; to enhance border patrol activities; to devote more funds
and manpower to the enforcement of employer sanctions; and to place fines on illegal
immigrants who are apprehended and found to be employed.
Obviously, refugees will continue to be admitted without regard to labor market
criteria. Nonetheless, it behooves the federal government to provide all financial
assistance necessary to prepare refugees to meet employment requirements of the local
communities in which they are settled. Refugees are admitted as the result of federal
government policy decisions and the federal government alone should bear the full
financial costs associated with their job preparation.
The national goal of all elements of the U.S. human resource development policy
must be to build a high wage, high-productivity labor force along the lines being pursued
by Japan and Germany. Shortages of qualified labor offer America a rare chance to
reduce its persistently high levels of unemployment, to improve the lot of its working
poor; to incorporate marginalized segments of the population into the mainstream; and
to rid itself of a large undercIass. Immigration policy must get into step with the pursuit
of these national objectives. Presently it is not.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
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